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Executive summary
India, with nearly 18 million people living abroad, has the largest emigrant population in the world.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are a major recipient of overseas labour migrants
from India. Migration to the GCC countries is characterised by short-term temporary migration,
migration of low- and semi-skilled labourers, and debt-financed migration. However, there are large
gaps in our understanding of how indebtedness shapes migration decision-making, work-related
choices and experiences, freedom in the migration process, remittance-sending behaviour, and
returned migrants’ experiences.
The Population Council in partnership with the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery (GFEMS) and
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) undertook a multi-component study
to better understand the relationship between debt and overseas labour migration from India. We
conducted a review of literature and descriptive and multivariate analyses, using publicly available
data sets such as the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) (2004–05 and 2011–12), the
National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Employment, Unemployment and Migration Survey (2007–
08), and KNOMAD-ILO Migration and Recruitment Costs Surveys covering India-Qatar (2015) and
India-Saudi Arabia (2016) migration corridors. We also conducted a large-scale household survey
in selected districts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and a small-scale qualitative study in the same
districts with current or returned migrants from the GCC countries. We note that these districts
were purposively selected to serve also as study location for an evaluation of an intervention
implemented for building a safe labour migration eco-system by the Association for Stimulating
Know-how (ASK), a non-profit organisation in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Finally, we organised a
stakeholder consultation that provided an opportunity for participants to reflect on the study
findings and brainstorm about research and programme gaps and recommendations for different
stakeholders.

Key findings
Indebtedness characterised the economic condition of notable proportions of international
migrant, internal migrant and non-migrant households in India. Forty-two percent of the
households with international migrants were indebted in India in 2011–12. A larger proportion of
internal migrant households were indebted than were non-migrant and international migrant
households. However, the international migrant households tended to have higher amounts of
debt than internal migrant or non-migrant households. The household survey in Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh in 2021–22, for example, found that 56 percent of households with international
migrants had outstanding debt exceeding Rs 50,000 at the time of the survey compared with 47
percent of households without international migrants. Indebtedness among international migrant
households was higher among households belonging to socially disadvantaged castes than
privileged castes, households that were in rural areas than urban areas, households that were
Hindu than Muslim, and households with larger than smaller household size.
Households in India, including those with international migrants, have traditionally relied on
unsecured debt.1 The household survey in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 2021–22, for example,
showed that international migrant households borrowed more often from non-institutional credit
agencies than from institutional agencies. Micro-finance institutions were the most preferred
option for loans among the institutional credit agencies, while friends and relatives were the
preferred choice among the non-institutional agencies. There were regional differences, where
international migrants from the southern and western regions reported that they took loans from
institutional credit agencies more often than they did from non-institutional credit agencies, while
those from the northern and eastern regions reported that they took loans from non-institutional
credit agencies more often than they did from institutional credit agencies. Households with
international migrants often took loans for consumer expenditures such as housing, marriage1

Debt that is not secured by any collateral.
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related expenses, and other household expenditures, a pattern observed for the general
population in India.
Emigration is a costly venture and costs of migrating to the GCC countries have heavily fallen on
migrant workers. Migration costs varied by destination countries, but there were substantial
variations in emigration expenses incurred by emigrants from across various states of India even
when emigrating to the same destination countries (for example, emigrants to Saudi Arabia from
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh paid Rs 73,916, those from Kerala paid Rs 82,672, and those from Tamil
Nadu paid Rs 93,557). Migration expenses incurred by workers amounted to a few months to
several months of their earnings in various countries and far exceeded the fees that the Indian
government allows recruitment agents to charge emigrants. Emigrants were largely unaware of the
itemised costs of migrating overseas, which reflect the lack of transparency and use of deception
in the migration processes as well as the increased vulnerability of overseas labour migrants.
Migrants paid for many items (agent fees, visa fees, airfare, medical tests, skills tests, etc.), and
the items varied as did their costs by the destination countries they were emigrating to. Compared
with the amount paid by emigrants to Qatar, the amount paid by emigrants to Saudi Arabia was
2.2 times higher for taking skill tests, 1.3 times higher for obtaining a passport, 1.6 times higher
for undergoing medical check-ups, and 2.6 times higher for pre-departure briefings. Fees paid to
the recruitment agents accounted for the largest share of the cost incurred by emigrants. The
average fee paid to the recruitment agent, for example, was 48 percent of the total cost borne by
emigrants to Qatar and 65 percent of the cost borne by emigrants to Saudi Arabia.
Migration cost was higher for the vulnerable groups. Although not consistently observed across
studies, less educated migrants (Grade 10 or below), migrants with limited social networks
overseas, migrants who secured overseas jobs with the help of recruitment brokers/agents, and
migrants who travelled with non-work visas incurred more expenses than other migrants. A study
of emigrants from Kerala, for example, reported that the migration expenses incurred were 29
percent lower for those with post-secondary schooling (more than Grade 10) than those who had
completed Grade 10 or less. The Population Council’s primary qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh noted that the average cost paid by migrants with 10 or fewer years of schooling was Rs
81,417, while it was Rs 54,000 for those with more than 10 years of schooling.
Emigrants tended to use multiple sources to finance overseas migration. Between 22 percent and
64 percent of the emigrants in various studies reported that they used their personal savings or
savings of their immediate family. While large-scale studies from more developed geographies
observed that 48-52 percent of the emigrants used personal savings or savings of their immediate
family, small-scale studies of low-skilled migrants from less developed geographies reported that
smaller proportions of emigrants used their own or family savings (22–34%). Some 19–44 percent
of emigrants reported that they borrowed from relatives or friends and 9–16 percent reported that
they took bank loans. In most studies, five percent or less reported that they borrowed from
moneylenders, although some studies reported that emigrants often took loans from
moneylenders. Reasons for migrants’ and their families’ relying on informal sources of credit
include no requirement to pay interest (as among relatives and friends), simpler and speedier
access to credit, flexible repayment period, non-requirement of guarantees, and lack of awareness
about the process for securing a loan from banking institutions.
The amount of household debt is significantly associated with overseas migration. Findings
showed that overseas migration was higher among households with larger debt. Debt-driven
pressures to migrate were intensified by lack of or irregular employment opportunities and low
levels of earnings back home, household-level dependency on migrants, and concerns about
inability to meet aspirations to change one’s life significantly, such as acquiring assets, educating
children, and meeting marriage-related expenses. Findings were inconsistent about the
relationship between debt and work-related choices and experiences of overseas migrants to the
GCC countries from India. The expenses incurred by emigrants who borrowed money to finance
their migration were higher than those who did not do so, although it is difficult to discern whether
vi

migrants borrowed more money because they were overcharged or vice-versa. While some
managed to repay the debt quickly, others, particularly poorer and less-skilled migrants, took years
to pay off migration debts, perhaps because of low salary earned overseas owing to employer
practices of wage repressions, wage theft and extraction of illegal fees, inability to save enough
from overseas salary to clear their debts, loss of work before the expiry of the contract, high cost
of emigration, and high interest charged by moneylenders. The vulnerability caused by debtfinanced migration is reported among returned migrants as well, especially those who return in
times of distress. Returning before their term of contract ends often leaves migrants in a debt trap,
as they cannot repay their loans. A sizeable share of international remittances was used for
repaying debts—nationally, 28 percent of households that received international remittances used
it for debt repayment. Migrant workers and their family members as well as key informants
perceived that low-interest or interest-free loans would be most helpful for migrant labourers.

Recommendations for governments
Sustained action by the central government and state governments in India and effective
cooperation between India and receiving countries are critical for safe overseas migration of
labourers. The Draft Emigration Bill 2021 has delineated several measures to curb recruitmentrelated abuses by recruitment agents, increase the number of registered recruitment agents, and
evolve performance standards for regular performance monitoring and periodic rating of
recruitment agencies. It is important that the Bill is passed without any further delay and
implemented effectively. Expanding emigration services by the Protector of Emigrants (PoEs)
beyond the current 13 PoEs to major regions within states, particularly to the main overseas laboursending states, is also important. Establishing more government recruitment agencies, similar to
NORKA Roots of Kerala, Overseas Manpower Corporation Ltd. of Tamil Nadu, and similar
counterparts in other states and expanding the reach of such recruitment agencies can play a
pivotal role. Strengthening the enforcement and monitoring of the provisions of the Labour and
Manpower Cooperation MOUs/Agreements that are in place with the GCC countries for data
sharing on workers, monitoring employers and worker grievances, and addressing issues such as
forced early return is needed.
Government engagement with companies to simplify the recruitment chain is important. The Draft
Emigration Bill 2021 has articulated that every employer who intends to recruit, either directly or
through recruiting agencies, shall obtain an accreditation from the competent authority. However,
reducing the cost of overseas labour migration also requires working with employers, including
encouraging them to recruit labourers directly, bear the costs of migrant recruitment, and be
accountable in respecting migrant workers’ rights. Governments in recipient countries have a key
role to improve employer practices. Reducing administrative costs and documentation associated
with labour migration is another step that the Indian government and receiving countries may
adopt to reduce the costs of overseas labour migration.
Improving the quality of information made available to potential migrants can have an impact on
both intentions to migrate and conditions in which people move. Findings show, for example, that
many migrants remain indebted upon their return, which highlight the need for aspiring migrants
to be made aware that overseas migration does not necessarily make them economically better
off. They need help to assess the trade-off between economic and social costs of migration and
likely improvements in individual and family well-being before they decide to emigrate. There is a
need to strengthen and publicise measures such as pre-departure orientation training and also to
disseminate information on migrant resource centres and grievance outlets for aspiring, current,
and returned migrants. Expanding monitoring of labour rights violations and providing outlets for
migrants to make claims against brokers, employers, and recruitment agencies are also needed.
The international safe migration agenda and forced labour conditions need to be mainstreamed
at the panchayat, block, and district levels.
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Migrants are identified as a key target group under the National Strategy for Financial Education
2020–25. Such programmes can be directed at migrants at a time when they and their families
are likely to be more responsive and open to financial education (for example, at pre-departure
orientation and integration programmes). Where the causes of indebtedness are structural,
financial literacy may not be sufficient by itself. Formulating policies to finance migration, including
provision of soft loans to those migrating, will play a pivotal role. Targeted interventions—insurance
mechanisms, social protection, and better access to health—that can potentially protect migrants
and their families against adversities or shocks are also critical. Current migrants, especially those
who have experienced labour exploitations, should be made eligible for access to governmentsponsored social security schemes. Difficulties faced by the ultra-poor households in availing the
schemes and in dealing with trust issues need to be addressed. Debt relief interventions that
combine debt forgiveness with strong incentives for the re-establishment of longer-term lending
relationships and timely repayment for aspiring, current, and returned migrants may be explored.
Such interventions may target migrants who returned before completing their contracts and
following experiences of labour exploitations.
Conditions in labour markets at origin and destination are intrinsically linked to debt-driven and/or
debt-financed migration. Creating more and better employment opportunities and improving the
employability of potential migrants, especially youth, may help in reducing the vulnerabilities faced
by migrant workers.

Recommendations for programme implementers and civil society
Collaborations between programme implementers, civil society, and government bodies are
needed to popularise various measures implemented by the government to protect overseas
labour migrants, to build trust in these measures, and to ensure that they reach large proportions
of migrant labourers. Similar collaborations are required to ensure effective implementation of
livelihoods, social protection, and financial inclusion measures for the benefit of vulnerable
population groups, which in turn may reduce the tendency to migrate at any cost and through any
means. There is also a need for programme implementers to design and implement innovative
interventions that inform overseas labour migrants, particularly first-time migrants, those who are
less educated, and those without social networks overseas, about deceptive practices in the
migration processes and details of expected costs they will incur in order to promote safe
migration.
There is a need for a collaboration between programme implementers and monitoring, evaluation,
and learning practitioners to assess the effectiveness of measures taken to protect overseas
labour migrants in combating exorbitant and illegal migration fees and debt burden on them and
their families and, if required, suggest ways to improve the efficacy of these measures. Similar
collaborations are required to generate evidence on what works to promote safe migration for
overseas labour migrants.
Programme implementers and civil society may also advocate for faster enactment of the Draft
Emigration Bill 2021 and, once enacted, the effective implementation of the strategies and
guidelines articulated in the Bill. Programme implementers and civil society may engage with local
government and create a ‘people’s organisation’ in the migrant community to increase their
bargaining and negotiation powers with authorities. The diaspora, community, civil society
organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be the best placed to discuss
financial matters with migrants and also to help build trust, given a perceived lack of trust in
financial institutions and some government organisations.

Recommendations for monitoring, evaluation, and learning practitioners
There is a need to create a migration data ecosystem to capture the trends and characteristics of
labour outflows that will encompass all categories of migrant workers, including aspiring migrants,
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first-time migrants, seasoned migrants, migrants who require emigration clearance, those who do
not, migrants who emigrate with the help of registered recruitment agencies, and those who
emigrate through alternative channels such as unregistered agents and brokers, friends and
acquaintances, and relatives. The possibility of using pre-departure training centres and registered
recruitment agencies for collecting data pertaining to potential migrants needs to be explored.
Periodic surveys that use research designs that can bring source and destination insights together
of potential migrants, migrants in destination countries, and returned migrants and their families
are also needed.
There is a need to capture more up-to-date data on the levels and patterns of indebtedness among
internal and international migrant households as well as data on the profile of indebted migrant
households. The feasibility of including a small set of questions on household migration in future
rounds of the Debt and Investment Survey conducted by the National Statistical Office needs to be
explored. Systematically documenting not only the whole cost, but also specific monetary costs
incurred by migrant workers seeking jobs abroad and social costs associated with such migration
is also important.
Findings showing large variations in many worker-paid pre-departure costs to the GCC countries
call for further research to understand the reasons for these differences, including those examining
the implementation of regulations and policies in India as also differences in conditions and
policies among destination countries. Additionally, findings pertaining to huge variability in
migration costs by socio-demographic characteristics of emigrants, emigration processes,
recruitment channels, and so on emphasise the need for more research to uncover additional
determinants of migration costs with a view towards identifying interventions where policy can play
a role.
Major gaps in the available secondary data limit an examination of labour exploitations, particularly
severe exploitations experienced by overseas labour migrants. There is also limited evidence on
responsible sourcing of migrant workers on issues such as the labour recruitment practices of
overseas companies and employers, the kind of labour protection measures implemented in
destination countries, and the labour protection systems that can be built into the recruitment
processes at source and destination countries.
Implementation research is needed to examine what works to ensure that protective measures for
overseas labour migrants reach large proportions of migrant labourers and to see how effective
these measures are in combating exorbitant and illegal migration fees and debt burden on migrant
labourers and their families. Assessing the effectiveness of interventions focusing on addressing
structural issues, such as insecurity of livelihoods for low- and semi-skilled labourers, limited social
protections, and systemic challenges to financial inclusion, in reducing debt-driven and debtfinanced overseas labour migration is critical. There is also a need for stronger evidence on what
works to promote safe migration for overseas labour migrants in general and for those who
undertake debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration in particular. It is important that evaluations
of safe migration interventions have a longer time frame to allow tracking of migrant workers over
time.

Recommendations for funding agencies
Translating several of the recommendations listed above into action requires substantial financial
investments. Funding agencies should increase investments to generate evidence on what works
to prevent debt-driven and/or debt-financed overseas labour migration. They can, for example,
support experiments with financial institutions to increase risk appetite for loans among the more
vulnerable and to design and offer low-cost financial products to migrants. They can also support
financial institutions to meet operational expenses until the programme becomes self-sustainable
and financially viable. They may invest in debt and financial literacy programming and financial
inclusion programmes for migrant communities through programme implementers and financial
institutions. Funding agencies may support state and local governments and programme
ix

implementers in setting up ethical recruitment agencies and experiment with no-fee or employerpaying migration models.
Funding agencies may work with the national government, district and state governments,
programme implementers, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) practitioners to create
a migration data ecosystem. They may also advocate with and support international and bilateral
agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), and the World Bank in generating comprehensive data on labour exploitations in
various migration corridors. Investing in formative and implementation research studies that could
fill current evidence gaps, as articulated in the sections on recommendations for MEL practitioners
and programme implementers, should be a priority for funding agencies.
There is also a need for multi-donor collaborations to bring more attention to the issue of labour
exploitation experienced by overseas labour migrants among key stakeholders, including the
Indian government and governments in destination countries.
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1.

Background and objectives

India, with nearly 18 million people living abroad, has the largest emigrant population in the world,
making it the top origin country globally in 2020 (IOM, 2021). It was also the largest remittance
recipient country, with USD 83.15 billion received in 2020. Twenty-eight percent of overseas
Indians resided in the GCC countries in 2020 (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
n.d.). Migration to the GCC countries from India is of a temporary nature and is characterised by
the predominance of unskilled labourers (Rajan and Arokkiaraj, 2020). The number of low-skilled
workers migrating from India to the GCC countries has decreased significantly over the past decade
(Calabrese, 2020; Chanda and Gupta, 2018; Sasikumar, 2019). The number of Indians granted
emigration clearance to work in the GCC and other countries, for example, declined by almost 60
percent, from 781,000 in 2015 to 334,000 in 2019 (Calabrese, 2020). Wage stagnation and
narrowing wage gaps, implementation of policies and programmes to increase the employment of
home country nationals, an increase in work permit renewal fees and taxes, cost of living expenses
in the GCC countries, and tightening of procedures by the Indian government for sending workers
abroad have contributed to this reduction. Studies have shown that labour migration to the GCC
countries from India is often debt-financed migration. However, there are large gaps in evidence
on how indebtedness shapes migration decision-making, work-related choices and experiences,
freedom in the migration process, remittance-sending behaviour, and experiences upon return to
India among overseas labour migrants.
The Population Council, in partnership with GFEMS and Norad, undertook a multi-component study
to better understand the relationship between debt and overseas labour migration from India.
Specifically, the study sought to shed light on:
•
•
•
•
•

Levels and patterns of household indebtedness among migrant households, with a special
focus on households with overseas migrants;
Cost of overseas labour migration from India and the role of debt in financing overseas
migration;
Role of debt in migration-related decisions;
Differences in work-related choices and experiences and financial vulnerabilities
experienced by migrant workers by household indebtedness; and
Migrant workers’ perceptions about financial products that can potentially reduce their
financial vulnerabilities.

This report describes findings from the above-mentioned study. Following a description of the study
design and limitations, this report describes the levels and patterns of household indebtedness
and socio-demographic differentials in indebted international migrant households. It then sheds
light on the costs incurred for overseas labour migration and the role of debt in financing migration,
migration-related decisions, work-related choices and experiences, and financial vulnerabilities
faced in India and overseas. This is followed by a description of financial products that can
potentially reduce financial vulnerabilities of overseas labour migrants. The report concludes with
recommendations for programmes and research.

1.1

Methodology

The study comprised: (1) a review of literature, (2) further analyses of available secondary data,
(3) primary data from a large-scale household survey in selected districts of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, (4) primary data from a small-scale qualitative study with current or returned migrants
from the GCC countries in the same districts as those of the household survey, and (5) a
stakeholder consultation.
We conducted a review of literature to gather what is known about migration costs and the
relationship between debt and overseas labour migration from India. We included studies
published between 2010 and 2021 in English that focused on international migration from India

and presented evidence on debt, migration costs, migration processes, work experiences
overseas, and remittances.
We carried out descriptive and multivariate analyses using publicly available data sets. These
included the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) (2004–05 and 2011–12),2 the National
Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Employment, Unemployment and Migration Survey (2007–08),3 and
KNOMAD-ILO Migration and Recruitment Costs Surveys that covered India-Qatar (2015) and IndiaSaudi Arabia (2016) migration corridors.4 We conducted a descriptive analysis of the level of
household indebtedness, amount and sources for household debt, changes in household
indebtedness over time, and differentials in household indebtedness by household migration
status, drawing on IHDS data for India. We used multinomial logistic regression analysis and
distributed lag model to examine the association between the amount of household debt and
internal and international migration of household members, using data from the 2004–05 and
2011–12 IHDS.5 Drawing on NSSO 2007–08 survey data for India, we conducted a descriptive
analysis of the proportion of households that received remittances from migrants, purposes for
which remittances were used by recipient households, and use of remittances for debt repayment.
We conducted descriptive and bivariate analyses of cost of migration, sources for financing
migration, and association between debt and work experiences overseas and financial
vulnerabilities experienced by overseas labour migrants, drawing on the migration cost data from
KNOMAD-ILO Migration and Recruitment Costs Surveys that focused on India-Qatar corridor (2015)
and India-Saudi Arabia corridor (2016).
We conducted a household survey to gather information on household debt and migration in
purposively selected districts—Siwan and Gopalgunj in Bihar and Deoria and Kushinagar in Uttar
Pradesh—during 2021–22 (see Annex Table 1 for background characteristics of the surveyed
households). These districts are characterised by high labour migration to the GCC countries (ASK
Training & Learning, 2020). We completed the household survey in 12,273 households, with a
response rate of 94 percent, in 60 villages of these districts.6 The study protocol was approved by
the Population Council’s Institutional Review Board. We conducted descriptive analyses of
differentials in household indebtedness and debt repayment, including sale of assets by household
migration status, that is, households with and without international migrants.7 We used
multivariate logistic regression analysis to examine the association between household
indebtedness and migration of household members to the GCC countries.
We conducted a primary qualitative study that comprised in-depth interviews (IDIs) with returned
migrants or current migrants or a household member of current migrants and key informant
interviews (KIIs) to generate nuanced insights into the relationship between household debt and
overseas labour migration. We used convenience sampling to draw respondents for the qualitative

The India Human Development Survey is a nationally representative, multi-topic panel survey of households in villages and urban
neighbourhoods across India (https://ihds.umd.edu/).
3 The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Employment, Unemployment and Migration Survey 2007–08 is a nationally
representative household survey conducted to provide estimates pertaining to employment and unemployment and migration at
the national and state levels (https://mospi.gov.in › 533_final1602152784394.pdf).
4 These surveys were conducted among migrants primarily employed in low-skilled positions in Qatar/ Saudi Arabia and returning to
India for visits or permanently. Respondents were selected using convenience or snowball sampling and comprised workers who
were recruited in India and received a job offer prior to migrating to Qatar/ Saudi Arabia
(https://www.knomad.org/data/recruitment-costs).
5 The question for measuring current migration sought to ascertain whether any woman/man/child in the household lived outside the
household.
6 We note that these districts were purposively selected for evaluating a safe labour migration ecosystem-building intervention
implemented by ASK, a non-profit organization, in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. We took advantage of the evaluation to gather
additional information about household debt and migration at baseline to economise on resources. We included a module on
household debt and migration in the household survey to identify aspiring migrants for the evaluation study. We selected 15
villages within each district, and we listed 13,108 households in the four districts together. We listed 150–200 households within
each selected village. We divided large villages into segments of approximately 150–200 households and selected one segment
randomly for household listing.
7 We categorized households as international migrant households if any male member of the household was currently working in the
GCC countries or ever returned after working in the GCC countries.
2
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study from the household survey described above. 8 We interviewed 21 returned migrants and 16
current migrants or their household members. We conducted interviews with key stakeholders
knowledgeable about overseas labour recruitment processes in the states of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh.9 We interviewed 19 key informants. The study protocol was approved by the Population
Council’s Institutional Review Board.
Study tools—household survey questionnaire, in-depth interview guide, and key informant interview
guide—were reviewed by colleagues from GFEMS and ASK, and their suggestions were
incorporated into the tools. The household survey questionnaire and the in-depth interview guide
were finalised after pre-testing among a small group of respondents (five respondents for the
household survey questionnaire and three respondents for the in-depth interview guide) to see
whether any questions should be changed, and whether the framing of the questions needs to be
simplified so as to ensure that the questions are well understood by the study participants. The
preliminary findings were shared through virtual meetings with GFEMS, ASK, and Mitrata. A data
interpretation workshop, facilitated by researchers from the Population Council, was held in Siwan
district in August 2022 to validate the research findings with key stakeholders and to solicit their
recommendations. The participants included aspiring migrants, migrants retuned from the GCC
countries, family members of current migrants in the GCC countries, and influential adults in the
community. A total of 18 people participated in the workshop. Researchers from the Population
Council shared key findings from the study in the local language (Hindi). This was followed by small
group discussions during which participants shared their views about the study findings and gave
their suggestions for making migration to the GCC countries safer and less expensive. Overall, the
findings from the study resonated with the participants’ opinion. The workshop participants made
some specific recommendations, including popularising measures implemented by the
government to protect overseas labour migrants, making low-cost loans available to potential
migrants, and skilling porgrammes to improve the employability of potential migrants, which were
incorporated in the final report.

1.2

Study limitations

Findings presented in this report should be interpreted with some limitations in mind. Most
importantly, national or state representative data on international migration are virtually absent in
India (Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, 2017). Available databases, including
embassy statistics, migration surveys conducted in selected states, and information available in
the NSSO Employment, Unemployment and Migration survey in 2007–08 are too limited for
understanding the profile of the emigrants per se. While basic data on passport holders with
Emigration Check Required (ECR) status are being collected when they emigrate, these data are
not available publicly. Moreover, the secondary data that are publicly available to examine the
relationship between household indebtedness and overseas labour migration from India are
limited and outdated,10 therefore, findings from the analyses of these do not reflect the current
situation of indebtedness among migrant households and its relationship with migration decisions
and experiences of overseas labour migrants. Second, the representativeness of study samples
used in publicly available secondary data and the primary data varied—a few were nationally
representative, community-based, household surveys (e.g., IHDS and NSSO survey), while others
relied on purposive, convenience, or snowball sampling (e.g., KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys).
We conducted IDIs with returned male migrants (aged 18–45, employed in low-skilled work in the GCC countries and returned in the
last two years) and current male migrants (aged 18–45 and currently working in GCC countries in low-skilled work) or a household
member of current male migrants. We prepared a list of households containing current or returned migrants who met the
eligibility criteria mentioned above, based on information collected in the household survey. We stratified this list of current or
returned migrants, based on their educational attainment (less than Grade 8/ Grade 10 and above), household economic status
(low/high), and household indebtedness at the time of the survey (with/without any loan outstanding). The participants for the indepth interviews were selected conveniently from this stratified list, taking into consideration their availability and willingness to
participate in a detailed interview.
9 These stakeholders included the Protector of Emigrants in Patna and Lucknow, district-level officials from the department of labour,
and representatives of registered and unregistered recruitment agencies, banking and non-banking institutions, and NGOs (ASK
and Mitrata).
10 Some data were from 2004-05, 2007-08, and 2011-12
8
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Therefore, findings cannot be generalised for overseas labour migration for the most part. Third,
several published studies do not include disaggregated information about migration costs incurred
by and work experiences of labour and professional migrants. Fourth, the unit of currency in which
migration costs were reported included Indian rupees and US dollars and we did not standardise
these costs, because the year in which migrants incurred costs are not available in most published
studies. Finally, data on household debt reported in earlier studies and our primary household
survey or qualitative study are not comparable because we did not standardise these numbers to
account for inflation or cost of living. Despite these limitations, we believe that our findings shed
new light on the relationship between household debt and overseas labour migration and could
guide future policies and interventions.

2.

Household indebtedness among migrant households

In India, household debt has been increasing (National Statistical Office, 2021; SBI Research,
2021); 35 percent of rural households and 22 percent of urban households were indebted in 2018
(National Statistical Office, 2021). Moreover, the average amount of debt increased by 84 percent
and 42 percent for rural and urban households, respectively, between 2012 and 2018 (SBI
Research, 2021).

Level of household indebtedness

Indebtedness characterised the economic
condition
of
notable
proportions
of
international migrant, internal migrant and
non-migrant households in India. The pan-India
IHDS showed that 46 percent of the
households were indebted in India in 2011–12
(Figure 1). However, a larger proportion of
internal migrant households were indebted
than international migrant or non-migrant
households (51% vs 42–46%). The latter
finding may reflect the multiple deprivations
faced by internal migrants. Studies of internal
migration in India observed that internal
migration was higher among households with
limited access to land and other assets and
chronically poor groups living in remote rural
areas (Czaika, 2011; Deshingkar, 2010; Rajan
and Bhagat, 2021). This finding may also
reflect the ability of international migrants to
repay their debt faster than internal migrants
(Mahapatro et al., 2017). The survey also
found that the proportion of indebted
households with international migrants was
slightly higher in rural than urban areas (43%
vs 41%).

Figure 1: Proportion of households that were
indebted by migration status, India, 2004–05
and 2011–12
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47 46

51 51
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47 46
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Note: Non-migrant households (N=36,900 in 2004–05 and
32,398 in 2011–12); internal migrant households (N=2,820
and 6,949); and international migrant households (N=298 and
671); differences were statistically significant at p≤0.001
Source: India Human Development Survey, 2004–05 and
2011–12

The household survey conducted by the Population Council in four districts of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh (i.e., two from each state) in 2021–22 showed that the proportion of households that
were indebted was the same among households with and without international migrants (43%
each; Figure 2). Indebtedness among households with international migrants was higher among
households belonging to socially disadvantaged castes than those from privileged castes,
households that were Hindu than Muslim, and households with a larger than smaller household
size. On the other hand, indebtedness was lower among households belonging to the wealthiest
quintile than those from poorer quintiles.
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Figure 2: Proportion of households that were indebted by international migration status, selected
districts, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22
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Note: Households without international migrants (N=9,574) and households with international migrants (N=2,699); the survey did
not collect data on internal migration and, therefore, it is possible that households with and without international migrant households
may contain internal migrants.
Source: Population Council’s Household Survey, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22

2.2

Amount of household debt

International migrant households tended to have higher amounts of debt than internal migrant or
non-migrant households in India. The IHDS showed that 73 percent of households with
international migrants had debts exceeding Rs 50,000 compared with 31–35 percent of internal
migrant and non-migrant households in 2011–12 (Figure 3). The household survey in Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh found that 56 percent of households with international migrants had outstanding
debt exceeding Rs 50,000 at the time of the survey compared with 47 percent of households
without international migrants (Figure 4). These differences could be because of the high cost of
overseas migration and higher household consumption expenditure (e.g., housing, marriage,
vehicle purchases, other) among international migrant households than internal migrant or nonmigrant households (Chellaraj and Mohapatra, 2014).
Figure 3: Amount of debt outstanding for
households by migration status, India, 2011–
12
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Figure 4: Amount of debt outstanding for
households by migration status, selected
districts, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22
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Pradesh, 2021–22

Sources for household debt

Available evidence on sources of credit for migrant households presents a varied picture. The panIndia IHDS showed that international migrant households were equally likely to borrow from
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institutional and non-institutional credit agencies (50% each; Table1). Banks were the most
preferred option among the institutional credit agencies, while among non-institutional credit
agencies, friends and relatives were the most preferred choice. However, there were regional
differences, where migrants from the southern and western regions reported that they took loans
from institutional credit agencies more often than from non-institutional credit agencies, while
those from the northern and eastern regions reported that they took loans from non-institutional
credit agencies more often than from institutional credit agencies.
Table 1: Sources from which households took loans by household migration status, India, 2011–
12
Sources from which households
Non-migrant
Internal migrant
International
took loans
households
households
migrant households
(%)
(%)
(%)
All India
Institutional credit agencies***
45
37
50
Non-institutional credit agencies***
55
63
50
Number of households1
17,340
4,081
348
Northern and eastern regions
Institutional credit agencies***
39
32
27
Non-institutional credit agencies***
60
68
73
Number of households1
10,700
3,131
150
Southern and western regions
Institutional credit agencies***
54
61
66
Non-institutional credit agencies***
46
39
34
Number of households1
6,640
950
198
Note: 1Of the households that had taken a loan in the last five years for IHDS; *** indicates that sources for credit differed
significantly by household migration status at p≤0.001.
Source: India Human Development Survey, 2011–12.

The household survey in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 2021–22 too showed that international
migrant households borrowed more often from non-institutional credit agencies than from
institutional credit agencies. Micro-finance institutions were the most preferred option for loans
among institutional credit agencies, while friends and relatives were the most preferred choice
among non-institutional credit agencies (Table 2).
Table 2: Sources from which households took loans by household migration status, selected
districts, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22
Sources from which households took
Households without
Households with international
loans
international migrants
migrants
Institutional credit agencies***
61.6
48.6
Non-institutional credit agencies***
54.9
67.3
1
Number of households
3,710
1,062
Note: 1Of households that had taken a loan in the last three years; *** indicates that sources for credit differed significantly by
household migration status at p≤0.001.
Source: Population Council’s Household Survey, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22

The regional differences in use of credit agencies by households with international migrants may
be due to differences in financial sector development across regions in India. Studies have shown
that despite reforms, banking development was significantly higher in the leading high income and
more developed regions compared with the lagging ones and that all bank groups, including public
banks, were concentrated more in the developed regions (Arora and Anand, 2021).
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2.4

Purposes for which households took loans

Households with international migrants often took loans for improving standard of living and
managing life events such as marriage, a pattern also observed for the general population in India.
The IHDS data showed that 72 percent of households with international migrants, 57 percent of
households with internal migrants, and 53 percent of non-migrant households that took loans in
2011–12 did so for housing, marriage-related expenses, buying vehicles, and other household
expenditures (Table 3).
Table 3: Purposes for which households took loans by migration status, India, 2011–12
Purposes for which households took
Non-migrant Internal migrant
International
loans
households
households
migrant households
Expenses for businesses (agricultural
25.1
20.0
13.4
& non-agricultural)
Human capital related (education,
medical expenses)
22.1
22.9
14.1
Consumption expenditure (housing,
52.5
56.7
72.4
marriage, vehicle purchases, other)
Other
4.3
3.9
10.8
Number of households1
17,340
4,081
348
Note: 1Of the households that had taken a loan in the last five years.
Source: India Human Development Survey, 2011–12

The Population Council survey in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 2021–22 mirrored these patterns
(Table 4). The survey also reported that 14 percent of households with international migrants that
took loans used them to finance domestic and overseas migration for work, but in particular,
overseas migration (discussed in detail in a later section). A small minority of households used the
loans they had taken to repay earlier loan/s (5–6%).
Table 4: Purposes for which households took loans by migration status, selected districts, Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh, 2011–12
Sources for household debt
Households without
Households with
international migrants international migrants
Expenses for businesses (agricultural &
24.2
19.5
non-agricultural)
Migration-related (internal & international)
1.8
13.7
Human capital related (education & medical
expenses)
27.4
24.5
Consumption expenditure (housing,
marriage, vehicle purchases, other)
58.1
54.0
Debt repayment
6.2
5.2
Other
0.3
0.2
Number of households1
3,710
1,062
Note: 1Of the households that had taken a loan in the last three years.
Source: Population Council’s Household Survey, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, 2021–22

3.

Costs of overseas labour migration and sources of financing

Several studies on emigration of Indian workers to the GCC countries have underscored that
emigration is a costly venture and that the costs of migrating to the GCC countries have heavily
fallen on the migrant workers (Abella, 2018; Abella and Martin, 2014; Ahmad, 2019; Buckley,
2012; Goud and Sahoo, 2019; Khan, 2019; Rajan et al., 2017; Soni, 2019). Various factors,
including the commercialisation of recruitment processes in the GCC-India migration corridors,
highly inefficient migrant labour market, conditions of excess supply of labour, lack of circulation
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of information about job opportunities in these countries, and dominance of recruitment agents
and intermediaries, tend to increase the cost of migration (Abella, 2018).

3.1

Costs of overseas labour migration

There were substantial variations in emigration Figure 5: Emigration expenses incurred by
expenses incurred by emigrants from various emigrants from various states of India to Saudi
states of India to the same destination countries Arabia
(Figure 5). While some of these differences
1
Tamil Nadu
could be due to variations in the cost of living at
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the time of emigration when these studies were
conducted, they could also be due to differences
2
in the profile of the emigrants and channels
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(2013)
though which they emigrated (as described in
detail later in this section).
Migration costs varied by destination countries
as well. Thus, further analysis of KNOMAD-ILO
migration cost survey data for the India-Qatar
and India-Saudi Arabia corridors showed that
low-skilled workers to Qatar paid on average Rs
58,830 and workers to Saudi-Arabia paid Rs
85,461. The Population Council’s qualitative
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study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh found that overseas labour spent, on average, Rs 56,819 for a
job in UAE, Rs 73,916 for Saudi Arabia, and Rs 80,62511 for other GCC countries (Kuwait, Oman,
and Qatar).
Migration expenses incurred by workers amounted to a few months to several months of their
earnings in various countries and far exceeded the fees that the Indian government allows
recruitment agents to charge emigrants. The costs, for example, paid by Indian low-skilled workers
amounted to 1.9 times of their monthly earnings in Qatar, 2.5 times in Kuwait, and 4.5 times in
Saudi Arabia (Abella, 2018; Abella and Martin, 2014).
Findings from the few studies that provide information about specific costs showed that migrants
paid for many items (e.g., agent/broker fees, passport, medical check-ups, pre-departure briefings,
insurance, in-land and overseas transportation) and the items varied as did their costs by the
destination countries they were emigrating to. Moreover, there were large variations in many
worker-paid pre-departure costs to the GCC countries. Thus, further analysis of KNOMAD-ILO
migration cost survey data showed that compared with the amount paid by emigrants to Qatar, the
amount paid by emigrants to Saudi Arabia was 2.2 times higher for taking skill tests (Rs 1,263 vs
Rs 564), 1.3 times higher for obtaining a passport (Rs 3,008 vs Rs 2,358), 1.6 times higher for
undergoing medical check-ups (Rs 4,409 vs Rs 2,678), and 2.6 times higher for pre-departure
briefings (Rs 3,339 vs Rs 1,266). Differences in the total and specific costs across destination
countries may be due partly to differences in the profile of emigrants and the processes through
which they secured a job overseas. At the same time, it is important to explore whether these
differences could be due to differences in conditions or policies in destination countries.
Emigrants, however, were largely unaware of the itemised costs of migrating overseas, which
reflect the lack of transparency and use of deception in the migration processes as well as the
increased vulnerability of overseas labour migrants. Most participants in the primary qualitative
study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were unaware of the itemised costs of migrating overseas, except
the cost of undergoing medical examination or travelling to transit points within the country such
as Mumbai or Delhi. Most noted that only the agent knew the itemised costs.
11 Excluding

the cost reported by one respondent who reported having incurred Rs 350,000 for a free visa.
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It cost me around Rs 60,000. Rs 3,000 was spent on medical check-ups. I had to pay Rs
60,000. I didn’t know what he took or how much. [Returned migrant, aged 28, education 8th
class, construction worker (shuttering work), UAE, IDI_4]
I had paid the full amount to the agent. I had spent Rs 80,000. I had also spent money for
making the passport and getting medical tests. I had spent around Rs 5,000 for my passport,
Rs 7,000 on medical tests. The agent told me that I have to spend this much money, after that
I can go abroad. [Returned migrant, aged 30, education 7th class, UAE, construction worker,
IDI_10]
Several studies reported that fees paid to the recruitment agents accounted for the largest share
of the costs incurred by emigrants. The average fee paid to the recruitment agent, for example,
was almost 48 percent of the total cost borne by emigrants to Qatar and 65 percent of the cost
borne by emigrants to Saudi Arabia. Seshan (2020) reported that visa costs and agency fees made
up the highest expenditures for Kerala migrants to the GCC countries (USD 548 and USD 251,
respectively). Likewise, the migration study in Tamil Nadu found that 50 percent of the cost
incurred was for paying agent fees (Rajan et al., 2017).
Migration costs varied by the characteristics of the migrants, for example, by age, education, social
networks, and prior work experience overseas. However, these differences were not observed
consistently across studies and destination countries. Further analysis of KNOMAD-ILO migration
cost survey data, presented in Table 5, showed that younger migrants (i.e., aged 30 or below) paid
less than older migrants (i.e., aged above 30) in the India-Qatar corridor (Rs 56,596 vs 60,924).
However, a reverse pattern was observed for the India-Saudi Arabia corridor (Rs 93,279 vs Rs
80,739).
Table 5: Cost of migration paid and reported by low-skilled workers by background
characteristics, India-Qatar and India-Saudi Arabia corridors, 2015 and 2016
Background characteristics
India-Qatar migration
India-Saudi Arabia migration
corridor (amount in Rs)
corridor (amount in Rs)
Age
21–30
56,596***
93,279*
31 and more
60,924
80,739
Level of education
Completed Grade 10 or less
57,281***
81,924
Completed more than Grade 10
69,700
NS
Prior overseas work experience
First-time migrant
59,149
86,031
Repeated migrant
57,726
82,961
Types of application
Agent/broker
56,290
91,843***
Manpower agency
60,318
NS
Relative/friends
NS
59,681
Total
58,830
85,461
Note: NS: not shown because of small number of cases, i.e., less than 25 cases; * and *** indicate that the differences were
significant at p≤0.05 and p≤0.001, respectively; see Annex Table 2 for background characteristics of surveyed respondents in
KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys.
Source: KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys

A study of emigrants from Kerala reported that migration expenses incurred by migrants from
Kerala were 29 percent lower for those with post-secondary schooling (more than Grade 10) than
those who had completed Grade 10 or less (Seshan, 2020). Although based on in-depth interviews
with a small number of current or returned migrants, the Population Council’s primary qualitative
study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh also found a similar pattern. The average cost paid by migrants
with 10 or fewer years of schooling was Rs 81,417, while it was Rs 54,000 for those with more
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than 10 years of schooling. These findings indirectly indicate that low-skilled migrant workers tend
to pay more than skilled workers for jobs abroad, perhaps because the excess demand for work by
low-skilled workers enables recruitment agents to surreptitiously charge them more than others. It
may also be because better educated and skilled workers may take up skilled positions for which
the migration costs are borne by the employer. We note, however, that a reverse pattern was
observed in the analysis of KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey data for the India-Qatar corridor,
where migrants who had completed Grade 10 or above had to pay more than those who had
completed Grade 10 or below (Rs 69,700 vs Rs 57,281; Table 5). It is difficult, therefore, to discern
whether the relationship between education and migration costs is indeed inconsistent or whether
the differences observed across studies were due to differences in study designs.12
Studies have also shown that the migration costs were lower for individuals with three or more
migrants in the household who had previously moved overseas for jobs than those without such
migrant networks (Seshan, 2020). It is possible that migrant networks could help to broker a job
match between foreign employers and aspiring migrants and thereby help to reduce or eliminate
the need for intermediating parties. Networks also help potential migrants to identify recruitment
agents who charge less for their placement services. Migration costs were found to be lower for
female than male migrants, perhaps because of better safeguards or scrutiny applied in the
recruitment process for particular occupations, such as domestic work, in which female labourers
are typically employed (Seshan, 2020).
Evidence on the relationship between migration costs and prior work experience overseas is
inconsistent. Analysis of KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey data showed that first-time migrants
paid a marginally higher amount than repeat migrants to Qatar (Rs 59,149 vs Rs 57,726; Table 5)
and Saudi Arabia (Rs 86,031 vs Rs 82,961; Table 5).
Migration costs varied by the processes through which migrants secured jobs overseas. KNOMADILO migration cost survey data for Saudi Arabia showed that low-skilled workers who applied for
jobs overseas with the help of agents/brokers paid 1.5 times more than those who applied with
the help of friends and relatives (Rs 91,843 vs Rs 59,681; Table 5). In the primary qualitative study
in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, labour migrants who secured a job with the help of agents spent more
than those who secured a job with the help of friends and relatives (Rs 84,278 vs Rs 71,142). At
the same time, it is notable that even those who migrated with the help of friends and relatives
incurred substantial expenses for migrating. Although reported by just three study participants,
those who obtained a job directly from the employer spent much less (Rs 21,336); one of these
participants who migrated thrice reported that overseas migration can be almost free, if the
migration was arranged by the overseas company.
He [recruitment agent] helped me to go, he got my visa and medical done. Everything was done
by him only. He helped me find the job and complete all the paperwork. I spent about Rs
100,000 for going there. [Returned migrant, aged 30, education 8th class, Oman, electrician
and mason, IDI_3]
My uncle's son helped me the most in going there [overseas]. He had already been there once
or twice so had experience and knowledge of the place. He had also been to the recruitment
agency’s office. He took me to the recruitment agency’s office. I did not go through any broker.
I had spent Rs 20,000 in the process of making a second passport because they denied to do
stamping on my visa as my photo was not matching. I gave Rs 45,000 to the recruitment
agency’s office. I guess for ticket. I had given Rs 8,000 for visa and Rs 5,000 for medical tests
separately [Returned migrant, aged 32, education 8th class, Saudi Arabia, farmer, IDI_1]

12

Seshan (2020) had used data from community-based representative household surveys, while India-Qatar analysis had used data
from a survey in which respondents were recruited using a convenience sample.
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I went for free the third time. There was a vacancy in the company. The company pays if the
people are needed. Then they bear all the expenses. They tell their registered office here that
we need these many people and the agent in the office will find people, get the interview
conducted, and then they take office charge which is around Rs 3,000, and then one has to
pay nothing. I just spent Rs 3,100. [Returned migrant, aged 45, education 10th class, Saudi
Arabia, construction worker, IDI_16]
Findings from the qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh showed that migration costs varied
by the type of visa used by emigrants. Individuals who travelled with a work visa spent on average
Rs 66,755 compared with Rs 91,333 spent by those who travelled with a tourist visa or other visas,
which suggests that irregular migrants spent more than the regular migrants.
I went with an employment visa. I had to give 30,000 rupees to the agency. I also spent Rs
5,200 for medical expenses. I had to stay in Mumbai, and I spent about Rs 400 for boarding
and lodging and Rs 4,000 for local transport. So, in total, I spent around Rs 50,000. The agency
told me that Rs 30,000 was for visa and tickets. [Returned migrant, aged 32, education
graduate, Saudi Arabia, IDI_1]
It was on a visiting visa. We spent about Rs 80,000. I gave him [agent] Rs 60,000; Rs 20,000
for medical. [Returned migrant, aged 30, education 10th class, Qatar, shuttering work, IDI_5]

3.2

Sources for financing overseas migration

Emigrants tended to use multiple sources to finance overseas migration, relying on their personal
and immediate family’s savings, taking loans from banks, borrowing from relatives and friends and
moneylenders, selling or mortgaging gold jewellery and properties, and so on. Between 22 percent
and 64 percent of the emigrants in various studies reported that they used their personal savings
or savings of their immediate family, including parents, to finance their overseas migration (Table
6). We note that small-scale studies focusing on less developed geographies reported a smaller
proportion of migrants using their own or family savings (22–34%).
Table 6: Sources for financing overseas migration, selected studies
Sources

Personal savings &
savings from immediate
family
Parents’ savings
Bank loans
Borrowings from friends &
relatives
Moneylenders
Selling gold
Selling land
Pawn shop
Government help
Other sources
Number of respondents

Kerala;
Rajan
et al.,
2017

Kerala;
Khan,
2019

Tamil
Nadu;
Rajan et
al., 2017

Uttar
Pradesh,
Ahmad,
2019

India1;
Abella &
Martin,
2014

India2

India3

48.3
46.4
8.5

33.6
–
16.1

52.4
43.9
9.0

21.7
–
15.2

25.0
–
–

51.9
–
–

64.1
–
–

26.5
5.1
23.8
–
–
0.0
1.6
2,082

24.1
–
23.4
2.9
–
–
–
137

24.8
27.5
24.8
–
–
0.7
11.7
1,257

39.1
4.3
–
4.3
–
–
15.2
51

19.4
38.7
–
–
9.7
–
9.5
31

44.4
3.7
–
–
–
–
–
401

32.3
3.7
–
–
–
–
–
409

Note: 1 Based on KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey data from 31 returned migrants from Kuwait; 2calculated using KNOMAD-ILO
migration cost survey data from 401 returned migrants from Qatar; 3calculated using KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey data from
409 returned migrants from Saudi Arabia.

Loans, particularly from informal sources, were an important means of financing migration. In the
studies cited above, 19–44 percent of emigrants reported that they borrowed from relatives or
friends, whereas only 9–16 percent reported that they used bank loans. Five percent or fewer
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reported that they borrowed from moneylenders in most studies, although some studies reported
that emigrants often took loans from moneylenders.
In the primary qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, most participants borrowed from
relatives for financing their overseas migration (18 out of 37 participants), followed by
moneylenders (9 out of 37) and friends (5 out of 37). Just three participants took loans from banks
and two used own savings to cover migration costs.

3.3

Reasons for reliance on informal credit sources

Several reasons have been pointed out for Indian households’ typical reliance on informal sources
of credit: Indian households often associate formal banking institutions with high transactions
costs, bureaucratic impediments, and complicated paperwork; they lack trust in formal banking
institutions and perceive that access to financial products is the prerogative of elite groups in
society; and they lack confidence in engaging with formal financial systems (Committee on
Household Finance, 2017). The primary qualitative study with current and returned migrants in
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh echoed these views.
When probed about the reasons for their borrowing money from relatives and friends or local
moneylenders, the migrants and their family members narrated such reasons as no requirement
to pay interest (as among relatives and friends), simpler and speedier access to credit, flexible
repayment period, non-requirement of guarantees, and lack of awareness about the process for
securing a loan from banking institutions.
From the villagers, where else will I take it from? We are not registered with banks or
cooperatives. We did not know how to take a loan from a bank. Taking it from here [local
lenders] seemed simpler. Also, can pay back any time, whenever we would be able to pay and
no guarantees required [Current migrant, age missing, education 10th class, Qatar, manual
labour, IDI_13]
I did not take the loan from the bank, but borrowed Rs 60,000–70,000 from friends for going
overseas. I took it from three friends at a rate of five percent interest because the bank told
me that I don’t have anything [for a guarantee]. It took me two years to repay. [Returned
migrant, aged 33, education 9th class, UAE, mason and electrician, IDI_19]
Key informants in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh further elaborated difficulties that migrants faced in
getting loans from banking institutions. They noted that banks require securities such as land, gold,
or personal guarantees from government employees to approve loans. They demand several
documents to ascertain the credibility of the customers. Banks also take a long time in processing
loan applications. Besides, banking staff behave rudely with economically poor customers. Local
moneylenders do not typically ask for mortgages or documents for giving loans and often reside in
the same village and therefore know the clients well.

4.

Household debt and overseas migration

Several studies pertaining to overseas labour migration from India have documented that overseas
labour migration entails significant resource outflows from households, including depletion of
personal and family savings, sale of precautionary assets, and borrowings from institutional and
non-institutional agencies (Abella, 2018; Abella and Martin, 2014; Ahmad, 2019; Buckley, 2012;
Goud and Sahoo, 2019; Khan, 2019; Rajan et al., 2017; Soni, 2019). Although debt-financed
migration is not new, the increasing cost of migration coupled with precarious and poorly regulated
labour practices in destination countries can increase migrant labourer’s vulnerability to labour
exploitations throughout the migration process, constrain their ability to repay their debt, limit the
potential benefits that migration brings, and create migration dependency (Buckley et al., 2016;
Davidson, 2013; IOM, 2019; Moniruzzaman and Walton-Roberts, 2017).
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4.1

Debt and migration-related decisions

Available evidence suggests that the amount of household debt is significantly associated with
overseas migration. Multinomial logistic regression analysis, using 2011–12 IHDS data showed
that after controlling for confounding factors, outstanding debt of more than Rs 50,000 was
positively associated with international migration (RR= 1.53; CI 1.18–1.97; p≤0.001), although no
such significant association was observed for internal migration. These differences may be related
to the capability of households to afford the higher costs of migrating to distant destinations.
Findings from the distributed lagged regression model that examined the temporal lagged
correlation between amount of household debt, measured in 2004–05, and household migration,
measured in 2011–12, after controlling for background characteristics, also reiterated the
relationship between household indebtedness and international migration. Outstanding debt of
more than Rs 50,000 in 2004–05 was associated with a significant increase in international
migration (RR= 1.73; CI 1.24–2.4; p≤0.001) and a decrease in internal migration in 2011–12
(RR=0.78; CI 0.68–0.9; p≤0.001).
In further analysis of household survey data that the Population Council collected in Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, the odds of having an aspiring migrant increased with the amount of debt outstanding,
from 1.36 for households that reported outstanding debt of Rs 10,001 to Rs 50,000 to 1.82 for
households with debt of Rs 50,001 and above. The odds of households’ reporting an aspiring
migrant was 1.4 times higher for households that perceived that they would not be able to repay
the debt on time than households with no debt.
In the primary qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, almost everyone talked about the
influence of financial difficulties in their decision to migrate, regardless of whether they reported
indebtedness or not. Even so, the narratives of current and returned migrants showed that
household indebtedness influenced the decision to migrate in several cases (16 out of 37 study
participants). Debt-driven pressures to migrate were intensified by lack of or irregular employment
opportunities and low levels of earnings back home, household-level dependency on the migrants,
and concerns about inability to meet aspirations to change one’s life significantly, for example,
acquiring assets, educating children, and meeting marriage-related expenses.
… My father had taken a loan. People who lent money used to ask for that back, so I thought
of working in better places. [Returned migrant, aged 35, education 12th class , Qatar, shuttering
work, IDI_5]
When I felt that my house would not be able to run with earnings here, I took this decision. If I
earn one month, sit idle at home next month here and how will I be able to manage my
household expenses? I was not getting work throughout the year in my village. The condition
of my house was bad, that's why I thought of going abroad. If I do not earn money by going
abroad, then how would I pay off the debt? We had a lot of debt and the condition of the house
was bad. I also had younger siblings in the house, so the one who is older will have to try and
go here and there to earn money. [Returned migrant, aged 35, illiterate, Dubai, construction
helper, IDI_11]
Several other participants, although not explicitly stating indebtedness as motivating decisions to
migrate, narrated the household's poor economic condition and constraints to meet even basic
needs as the reason for migrating.
There was no one to work at home. I was the only one, someone has to go to earn their
livelihood, right? Or else how will the household function? My father had died. So the entire
load was on me. I had to look after them so I had to go. When there is no one at home, anyone
will tell you to leave. Even outsiders will tell you. When you are 18 years old, you will be asked
to leave. It was my decision to go. If I didn’t go, who would look after my home? Like I told you
before, I used to earn Rs 14,000 rupees in plyboard work in a private company and from that,
I used to send Rs10,000 rupees and there were expenses too and there was no savings. By
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staying here, I couldn’t earn enough. So, I started looking for work. [Returned migrant, aged
30, education 10th class, Saudi Arabia, carpenter, IDI_7]

4.2

Debt and work-related choices and experiences

Debts incurred for financing migration along with pre-emigration indebtedness can feed
exploitative practices and precarious legal situations for migrants, amplifying the risks of unfree,
forced, or bonded labour (Strauss, 2012). Findings from our analysis of secondary data and the
primary qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were inconsistent about the relationship
between debt and work-related choices and experiences of emigrants to the GCC countries. We
acknowledge that available data are not sufficient to explore comprehensively differences in workrelated choices and experiences by debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration. Although
KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys collected information on a number of indicators related to
work environment, they did not collect information on severe labour exploitations (e.g., physical
violence, verbal abuse). Moreover, survey participants were selected using convenience or
snowball sampling and comprised workers who were recruited in India and had received a job offer
prior to migrating to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Hence, survey data may not be representative of the
typical migrant population in the India-GCC country corridors.
Analysis of KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey data on returned migrants from Qatar and Saudi
Arabia showed no differences in several indicators of work experiences of migrants who had
borrowed money to finance their migration and those who had not (Table 7). These included such
indicators as travelling with a work visa and a job contract, pursuing a job offered in the contract,
receiving wages regularly, receiving free accommodation, and getting one day rest per week. There
were also no differences between the migrants who had taken loans and those who had not in
receiving promised wages (although hardly any from the India-Saudi Arabia corridor received the
promised wages) and reimbursement of costs incurred for securing the job. However, a somewhat
larger proportion of low-skilled workers who had borrowed money reported deprivation of rights at
the workplace than those who had not in the India-Qatar corridor (7% vs 1%).
Table 7: Work experiences at destination of returned Indian migrants from Qatar and Saudi
Arabia, 2015 and 2016
Work experiences at destination

Employer provided a work visa (%)
Travelled with a job contract (%)
Reported having done the same
job as in job contract1
Received wages promised (%)
Paid regularly (%)
Received reimbursement of cost
incurred for securing the job at
destination from the employer (%)
Received free accommodation (%)
Received free food (%)
Mean hours worked in a week
Given one day rest/week (%)
Deprived rights at workplace13
Number of respondents
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India-Qatar Corridor

India-Saudi Arabia Corridor

Borrowed
money

Did not borrow
money

Total

Borrowed
money

Did not borrow
money

Total

99.5
99.5
100

100
99.5
100

99.8
99.5
100

100
100
99.3

100
100
99.6

100
100
99.5

97.9
100.0
3.6

96.6
100.0
2.4

97.3
100
3.0

0.7
100.0
0.0

1.5
99.6
0.0

1.2
99.8
0.0

99.0
32.6
59.0
100
7.3
193

98.6
20.7
59.4
97.6
1.4
208

98.8
26.4
59.2
98.8
4.2
401

96.6
29.9
51.1
99.3
2.0
147

97.3
32.8
507
99.6
0.4
262

97.1
31.8
50.9
99.5
1.0
409

Deprivation of right includes unable to express views freely, unable to join or organise a trade union, unable to engage in industrial
action such as going on strike or having collective bargaining power, unable to change employers, not entitled to the same wages
as native workers, restricted from remitting earnings, travel documents withheld by employers, unable to communicate with
people outside the job sites, no job security, excluded from social security, cannot practise own religion, not having decent work
hours/ rest days, leave benefit, and employee insurance benefits, etc.
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Note: 1Among those reported to have a job contract.
Source: KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys 2015 and 2016.

The qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh also showed an inconsistent relationship
between debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration and pre-emigration processes and overseas
work experiences. Most IDI participants reported smooth pre-emigration processes, regular
migration, and satisfaction with work overseas. These participants included both those who
reported debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration and those who did not report so, suggesting
no association between debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration and work experiences of
migrants for the most part.
They come to take you there. When you arrive, they are already waiting. They check your visa
and take you to the place. I reached there and started working the next day. I got the amount
that was promised. The company provides accommodation. It does not provide food. The
accommodation was better than I had thought. You face difficulties when you are not paid
enough and on time. I was paid on time. A bus would come to pick and drop you for work too,
so there were no problems. [Returned migrant, aged 33, education 5th class, Kuwait, farmer,
labour, IDI_14, reported neither pre-existing debt nor debt to migrate]
At the same time, it may be noted that the few participants who reported that they had experienced
difficulties during the pre-emigration phase (11 participants) and labour exploitations overseas (15
participants), had also reported pre-existing debt and/or debt to migrate. We acknowledge that it
is difficult to ascertain from the narratives whether the pre-emigration difficulties and labour
exploitations overseas experienced by these migrants were related to household indebtedness.
I didn’t get the work I had gone for, so I got other work and I did that. The agent told me that I
will get welding work there, but I got the job as a labourer in a date farm. [Returned migrant,
aged 35, education 10th class, Saudi Arabia, welder, construction, IDI_15, reported no preexisting debt, but borrowed for financing migration]
I was facing difficulty because there were delays in getting the residence permit because the
sponsor wasn’t depositing money for it. I was caught twice by the police and they put me in jail
once and they let me go the other time. They let you go thrice. It was already twice for me, if
they caught me for a third time they would send me back to India. [Returned migrant, aged 35,
education 7th class, Saudi Arabia, mechanical, driver, IDI_6, reported no pre-existing debt and
borrowed from relatives to finance migration].
We did not get the salary that we were promised. When we went to talk to them, they told us
that we can stay there if we want or else we can go back to India. [Returned migrant, aged 30,
education 10th class, UAE, carpenter, IDI_7, reported pre-existing debt].

4.3

Debt and financial vulnerabilities

Debt-driven or debt-financed migration tends to increase the financial vulnerabilities in multiple
ways. The expenses incurred by emigrants who borrowed money to finance their migration were
higher than those who did not do so among migrants to Saudi Arabia (Figure 6). However, no such
differences were observed for migrants to Qatar. We acknowledge that it is difficult to discern from
the data set whether the migrants borrowed more money because they were overcharged or viceversa.
Debt-driven or debt-financed migration can land several migrant workers in a debt trap (Buckley,
2012; Rajan et al., 2011; Thimothy and Sasikumar, 2012). KNOMAD-ILO migration cost survey
data showed that emigrants to Qatar reported their having repaid almost all of the loan amount
except for a balance of 10 percent of the amount borrowed (Figure 7). Emigrants to Saudi Arabia
reported that although they had repaid 110 percent of the loan amount, they still had an
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outstanding debt of nine percent of the loan amount. These workers remained in debt after they
returned from foreign migration.
Figure 6: Expenses incurred by emigrants who
borrowed money to finance their migration or
who did not borrow money reported by returned
migrants from Saudi Arabia, 2015–16
112425
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Figure 7: Average debt incurred for financing
migration, amount repaid, and amount
outstanding reported by returned migrants
from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 2015–16
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Source: Calculated using KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys,
India-Qatar and India-Saudi Arabia corridors, 2015-16

Rs 32232
Rs 32329
Mean outstanding debt
Mean amount repaid
Mean amount borrowed

Source: Calculated using KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys,
India-Qatar and India-Saudi Arabia corridors, 2015-16

While some managed to repay the debt quickly, others, particularly poorer and less-skilled
migrants, take years to pay off migration debts. The vulnerability caused by debt-financed migration
is reported among returned migrants as well, especially those who return in times of distress.
Returning before their term of contract ends often leaves migrants in a debt trap, as they cannot
repay their loans (Rajan, 2010). This has been seen recently in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic. Thousands of returning migrants have been left stranded with large debt burdens owing
to the non-payment of wages at the destination and additional costs incurred on arrival in India
(such as paid quarantine facilities early in the pandemic) (Piper and Foley, 2021; Kuttappan,
2020).
A large share of international remittances was Figure 8: Use of international remittance for
used for repaying debts incurred for migrating or repaying debt, selected studies
other purposes. The NSSO Employment,
India (urban, 2007-08)
17
Unemployment and Migration Survey (2007–
India (rural, 2007-08)
32
08) data showed that 28 percent of households
India
(overall,
2007-08)
28
that received international remittances used it
for repaying debt, with rural households twice as
likely as urban households to have used
Uttar Pradesh (2007-08)
13
remittances for repaying debt (32% versus
Tamil Nadu (2015)
43
17%). State-specific migration surveys also
Rajasthan (2014-15)
74
reported that a major share of remittances was
Kerala & Karnataka (2007-08)
31
used for debt-repayment (Figure 8).
Kerala (2014)

32

43
Analysis of the NSSO 2007-08 data showed that
compared with non-remittance recipient
0
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80 100
households,
households
that
received
Percent
international remittances spent more on
consumer and household durables, education, Sources: Values for India calculated from the NSSO Employment,
Unemployment and Migration Survey (2007–08); Bhagat et al.,
and health care (Chellaraj and Mohapatra, 2014; Mahapatro et al., 2017; Rajan et al., 2017; Soni, 2019.
2014; Mahapatro et al., 2017). Mahapatro and
colleagues (2017) found that compared with non-remittance recipient households, health care
expenditure was 3.4 percentage points higher, educational expenditure was two percentage points
Gujarat (2012)
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higher, and other expenses were four percentage points higher for international remittance
recipient households.
All participants except one in the qualitative study in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh reported remitting
their earnings to their families in India. When probed about how remittances were used, most
reported food and other day-to-day household expenditures (19 participants) and repayment of
loans (18 participants). Other items for which remittances were used included children’s education
(8 participants), medical expenses for family members (6 participants), farming (6 participants),
and construction of house (5 participants). Two participants each reported that they saved some
of the remittances and used it for purchasing land. Although based on a small number of cases,
findings show that those who reported pre-existing debt used remittances for debt repayment (12
out of 16 participants), followed by meeting day-to-day household expenditure (7 out of 16), and
children’s education (4 out of 16). In comparison, those who reported no such debt obligation
reported diverse use of remittances—meeting day-to-day household expenditure (12 out of 21
participants), house construction (5 out of 21), medical expenses (5 out of 21), children’s
education (4 out of 21), and farming (4 out of 21). We note that a few from this latter group had
borrowed money for migrating, although they did not have any prior household debt, and thus, six
out of the 21 participants reported using remittances for debt repayment.
A few participants were compelled to transfer the money to the bank account of moneylenders, as
the quote below indicates:
He sends money directly to the moneylender’s account. Their bank details were given. The
moneylenders told him to take their account details and keep sending money there directly
and whenever we are sick or need money for some reason, they will give it to us. For now, all
the money goes into repaying the debts. Who knows how long it will take? [Current migrant,
aged 21, education 10th class Qatar, cleaner, IDI_7]

5. Financial services that can reduce overseas labour migrants’
vulnerabilities
Findings presented in the previous sections have shown that loans were an important means of
financing migration, that non-institutional credit agencies were the major sources of credit for
financing migration, particularly in the northern and eastern regions, and that debt-driven or debtfinanced migration can land migrant workers in a debt trap. The primary qualitative study in Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh sought the perceptions of migrant workers and key informants about financial
services that can reduce migrant workers’ vulnerability.
Migrant workers and their family members as well as key informants perceived that low-interest or
interest-free loans would be most helpful for migrant labourers. Other studies have recommended
that such loans may reduce irregular migration and increase flow of remittances through formal
and legal channels (Gaur, 2019; Goud and Sahoo, 2019)
It would be good if we get a loan or some other help; it would be better if it is interest free
[Current migrant, age missing, education 8th class, Kuwait, labourer in a date palm farm, IDI_2]
Some participants also favoured a commitment savings product, though they noted that such
products would work for only those with some money to save.
We can do this only when we have money. It might help, but we need to have money to deposit
to avail these services. I have heard that these loans take less interest and are less effort too.
I have not taken it but I have heard so that might be helpful [Current migrant, age missing,
education 10th class, Qatar, labourer, IDI_13]

17

There were a few participants who felt that a livelihood loan and an insurance scheme would be
useful for those who aspire to migrate and for their families.
Insurance is useful in case you have a mishap. It is there. Like we have Jeevan Bima (life
insurance plan). It is helpful. Something like that would definitely help. [Current migrant, aged
40, education 10th class, Saudi Arabia, crane operator, IDI_10]
If they get a livelihood loan due to which they have a fixed income, it is the best option as they
will be safe from moneylenders. [Key informant, NGO representative, Uttar Pradesh]
We note that India had made the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (PBBY) mandatory for emigrant
workers falling under Emigration Check Required (ECR) category for overseas employment to ECR
countries in 2003, but awareness and reach of this insurance scheme are limited.
Few participants called for reducing the cost of overseas travels, providing opportunities for skill
upgradation, and opening government-run overseas recruitment agencies at the district level.
Some noted that if sufficient skill upgradation opportunities are created, many workers would
prefer to work in India itself.

6.

Recommendations

Findings presented in the previous sections highlight that indebtedness characterised the
economic condition of a large proportion of international migrant, internal migrant and non-migrant
households. Emigration is a costly venture and the costs of migrating to the GCC countries have
heavily fallen on the migrant workers. Costs of migrating were often covered by borrowings from
informal sources and rarely from formal credit sources. Household indebtedness influenced the
decision to emigrate in many cases of overseas labour migration in India. Although evidence on
the relationship between debt and work-related choices and experiences of overseas labour
migrants to the GCC countries is inconsistent, debt-financed migrants incurred larger costs for their
migration compared with their counterparts who did not incur any debt for financing their migration.
While some overseas migrants managed to repay the debt quickly, others, particularly poorer and
less-skilled migrants, took years to pay off migration debts. Many workers remained in debt even
after they returned from overseas. A large share of international remittance was used for repaying
debts.
This section presents research gaps and policy and programme recommendations informed by the
study findings for different stakeholders, for example, state governments and the national
government, programme implementers and civil society, monitoring, evaluation, and learning
practitioners, and funding agencies.

6.1

Recommendations for governments

Findings presented in the earlier sections highlight the need for reducing the costs of emigration,
improving household financial behaviours, creating responsible and low-cost lending programmes,
generating employment opportunities, and improving the employability of potential migrants for
addressing the vulnerability linked with debt-driven and/or debt-financed overseas labour
migration. Much of this work requires sustained action by the central government and state
governments in India and effective cooperation between India and receiving countries.
The Draft Emigration Bill 2021 has delineated several measures to register and regulate the duties
and functions of Human Resource agencies engaged in the business of recruitment for an
employer (Ministry of External Affairs, 2021). It is important that the Bill is passed without any
further delay and that these measures are implemented effectively to curb recruitment-related
abuses by recruitment agents.
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There is a need to increase the number of registered recruitment agents and ensure their spread
across major migrant-sending states, particularly in rural areas. Bringing sub-agents and brokers
into the formal sector and increasing the number of registered recruitment agents, especially in
rural areas of the major migrant-sending states, may help. While it was illegal for a recruiting agent
to hire a sub-agent as per the Emigration Act of 1983, the Draft Emigration Bill 2021 allows for it.
It is also important to evolve performance standards and undertake regular performance
monitoring and periodic rating of recruitment agencies. Performance standards should include
indicators related to respecting migrant worker’s rights and adherence to ethical recruitment
practices. Fixing recruitment service charges in conformity with market realities is also important.
It is important that law enforcement agencies at the central level and state levels play a proactive
role in enforcing these provisions. If recruitment agents are controlled well, audited well,
prosecuted well by the government, the exploitation of migrants, including exorbitant charges
collected by recruitment agents can be reduced.
Expanding emigration services by the Protector of Emigrants (PoEs) beyond the current 13 PoEs to
major regions within states, particularly to major overseas-labour-sending states, is also important.
Several PoEs currently have jurisdiction over more than one state and hence there is a need to
extend its reach. Establishing more government recruitment agencies, similar to NORKA Roots of
Kerala, Overseas Manpower Corporation Ltd of Tamil Nadu, and similar counterparts in other
states and expanding the reach of such recruitment agencies can play a pivotal role. Strengthening
the enforcement and monitoring of the provisions of the Labour and Manpower Cooperation
MOUs/Agreements that are in place with the GCC countries for data sharing on workers, monitoring
employers and worker grievances, and addressing issues such as forced early return is needed.
Government engagement with companies to simplify the recruitment chain is important. The Draft
Emigration Bill 2021 has articulated that every employer who intends to recruit, either directly or
through recruiting agencies, shall obtain an accreditation from the competent authority. However,
reducing the cost of overseas labour migration also requires working with employers, including
encouraging them to recruit labourers directly, bear the costs of migrant recruitment, and be
accountable in respecting migrant workers’ rights. Governments in recipient countries have a key
role to improve employer practices.
Reducing administrative costs and documentation associated with labour migration is another step
that the Indian government and receiving countries may adopt to reduce the costs of overseas
labour migration.
Improving the quality of information made available to potential migrants can have an impact on
both intentions to migrate and conditions in which people move. Findings show, for example, that
many migrants remain indebted upon their return, which highlight the need for aspiring migrants
to be made aware that overseas migration does not necessarily make them economically better
off. They need help to assess the trade-off between economic and social costs of migration and
likely improvements in individual and family well-being before they decide to emigrate. As noted
earlier, the Indian government has introduced pre-departure orientation training to migrant
workers and has established migrant resource centres. Unfortunately, awareness of and
participation in the pre-departure orientation training remain limited, and migrant resource centres
are not functional. The impact of such interventions may also depend on the content of these
programmes. There is a need to strengthen and publicise these measures as well as disseminate
information on grievance outlets for aspiring, current, and returned migrants.
Expanding monitoring of labour rights violations and providing outlets for migrants to make claims
against brokers, employers, and recruitment agencies are also needed. The international safe
migration agenda and forced labour conditions need to be mainstreamed at the panchayat, block,
and district levels. The District Legal Aid Authority should be mandated to offer legal recourse for
migrants and their families who experience labour exploitations.
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The National Strategy for Financial Education 2020–25 has articulated the need for providing
basic and sector-specific financial education to all, with a special focus on the unbanked and newly
banked individuals and households (Reserve Bank of India, 2021). Migrants are identified as a key
target group for such education. Such programmes can be directed at migrants at a time when
they and their families are likely to be more responsive and open to financial education (for
example, at pre-departure orientation and integration programmes). These programmes must use
existing infrastructure for migrants, such as migration resource centres, employment centres, and
remittance providers for delivering financial education initiatives. Programmes must also conduct
needs assessments to analyse financial literacy gaps of each group of migrants and their families
at different stages of the migration cycle. Needs assessments must go beyond remittances and
encourage long-term financial planning, savings, investments, and entrepreneurship. Where the
causes of indebtedness are structural, financial literacy may not be sufficient by itself. Formulating
policies to finance migration, including provision of soft loans, will play a pivotal role to those
migrating. Targeted interventions—insurance mechanisms, social protection, and better access to
health—that can potentially protect migrants and their families against adversities or shocks are
also critical. Current migrants, especially those who have experienced labour exploitations should
be eligible to access government-sponsored social security schemes. Difficulties faced by the ultrapoor households in availing the schemes and in dealing with trust issues need to be addressed.
Debt relief interventions that combine debt forgiveness with strong incentives for the reestablishment of longer-term lending relationships and timely repayment for aspiring, current, and
returned migrants may be explored. Such interventions may also target migrants who returned
before completing their contracts and following experiences of labour exploitations.
Conditions in the labour markets at origin and destination are intrinsically linked to debt-driven
and/or debt-financed migration. Creating more and better employment opportunities and
improving the employability of potential migrants, especially youth, may help in reducing the
vulnerabilities faced by migrant workers.

6.2

Recommendations for programme implementers and civil society

Programme implementers and civil society have an important role in taking forward the research
agenda described earlier and in supporting the national government and state governments in
translating policy commitments into action.
Collaborations between programme implementers, civil society, and government bodies are
needed to popularise various measures implemented by the government to protect overseas
labour migrants, to build trust in these measures, and ensure that they reach large proportions of
migrant labourers. Similar collaborations are required to ensure effective implementation of
livelihoods, social protection, and financial inclusion measures for the benefit of vulnerable
population groups, which in turn may reduce the tendency to migrate at any cost and through any
means. There is also a need for programme implementers to design and implement innovative
interventions that inform overseas labour migrants, particularly, first-time migrants, those who are
less educated, and those without social networks overseas, about deceptive practices in the
migration processes and details of expected costs they will incur in order to promote safe
migration.
There should be collaboration between programme implementers and monitoring, evaluation, and
learning practitioners to assess the effectiveness of measures taken to protect overseas labour
migrants in combating exorbitant and illegal migration fees and debt burden on them and their
families and, if required, suggest ways to improve the efficacy of these measures. Similar
collaborations are required to generate evidence on what works to promote safe migration for
overseas labour migrants.
Programme implementers and civil society may also advocate for faster enactment of the Draft
Emigration Bill 2021 and, once enacted, the effective implementation of the strategies and
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guidelines articulated in the Bill. There is a need for collaboration between programme
implementers, civil society, and government agencies to monitor the performance standards of
recruitment agencies and sub-agents, provide quality information to potential migrants, monitor
labour rights violations, and support migrants in reporting of labour exploitations and making
claims against brokers, employers, and recruitment agencies. Programme implementers and civil
society can also play an important role in spreading financial literacy and debt literacy among
migrants and their families. Programme implementers and civil society may engage with local
government and create a “people’s organisation” in the migrant community to increase their
bargaining and negotiation powers with authorities. The diaspora, community, civil society
organisations, and NGOs may be the best placed to discuss financial matters with migrants and to
help build trust, given a perceived lack of trust in financial institutions and some government
organisations,

6.3 Recommendations for research, monitoring, evaluation, and learning
practitioners
Several evidence gaps remain on the relationship between household indebtedness and overseas
labour migration. Recommendations for addressing this lack are described below.
Most importantly, there is a need to create a migration data ecosystem to capture the trends and
characteristics of labour outflows that will encompass all categories of migrant workers, including
aspiring migrants, first-time migrants, seasoned migrants, migrants who require emigration
clearance, those who do not, migrants who emigrate with the help of registered recruitment
agencies, and those who emigrate through alternative channels such as unregistered agents and
brokers, friends and acquaintances, and relatives. The possibility of using pre-departure training
centres and registered recruitment agencies for collecting data pertaining to potential migrants
needs to be explored. Periodic surveys that use research designs to bring source and destination
insights together of potential migrants, migrants in destination countries, and returned migrants
and their families are also needed.
There is a need to capture more up-to-date data on the levels and patterns of indebtedness among
internal and international migrant households as well as data on the profile of indebted migrant
households. The feasibility of including a small set of questions on household migration in future
rounds of the Debt and Investment Survey conducted by the National Statistical Office needs to be
explored. It is also important that future migration surveys and studies include questions that can
shed more light on household indebtedness, characteristics of indebted migrant households,
changes in indebtedness over the course of the migration process, situations and factors leading
to indebtedness among migrant households, consequences of indebtedness among them, and
ways and mechanisms that can help them circumvent a debt trap.
Data on the cost of overseas labour migration continue to be limited and there are major gaps in
the currently available database. The KNOMAD-ILO migration cost surveys, though focused on lowskilled migrant workers, were restricted to returned migrants from Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia
for the India component. These surveys were administered to workers recruited in India and with
a job offer prior to migrating. They hardly included those who were not recruited, but had moved
abroad in search of work without any prior job offers. Migration costs reported in several published
studies does not differentiate between expenses incurred by migrant labourers and that by
professionals and between the countries that are the major recipients of migrant labourers and
other countries. Moreover, several published studies had drawn data from a small number of
emigrants. These findings underscore the need for systematically documenting not only the whole
cost, but also specific monetary costs incurred by migrant workers seeking jobs abroad and social
costs associated with such migration.
Findings showing large variations in many worker-paid pre-departure costs to the GCC countries
call for further research to understand the reasons for these differences, including examining the
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implementation of regulations and policies in India and differences in conditions and policies
among destination countries. Additionally, findings pertaining to huge variability in migration costs
by socio-demographic characteristics of emigrants, emigration processes, recruitment channels,
and so on emphasise the need for more research to uncover additional determinants of migration
costs, with a view towards identifying interventions where policy can play a role.
The evidence on the relationship between debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration and workrelated choices and experiences is at best inconclusive. It is important to examine, from
representative samples of returned migrants, whether migration becomes a debt trap or a wealthcreation opportunity for overseas labour migrants. There is also a need to generate insights about
how household indebtedness and debt-financed migration affect different population sub-groups,
including female migrants and migrants belonging to different socio-economic groups.
Findings presented in this report also highlight gaps in the available secondary data on labour
exploitations, particularly severe exploitations experienced by overseas labour migrants. There is
also limited evidence on responsible sourcing of migrant workers on issues such as the labour
recruitment practices of overseas companies and employers, the kind of labour protection
measures implemented in destination countries, and the labour protection systems that can be
built into the recruitment processes at source and destination countries.
The Government of India has taken several measures to protect overseas labour migrants.
Awareness and reach of these protective measures, however, remain limited. Implementation
research is needed to examine what works to ensure that these protective measures reach large
proportions of migrant labourers and to see how effective these measures are in combating
exorbitant and illegal migration fees and debt burden on migrant labourers and their families.
Several measures have been taken for addressing some of the structural issues underlying debtfinanced and debt-driven migration of overseas labour migrants such as insecurity of livelihoods
for low- and semi-skilled labourers, limited social protections, and systemic challenges to financial
inclusion, among others. Assessing the effectiveness of interventions focusing on addressing
structural issues in reducing debt-driven and debt-financed overseas labour migration is critical.
There is also a need for stronger evidence on what works to promote safe migration for overseas
labour migrants in general and those who undertake debt-driven and/or debt-financed migration
in particular. It is important that evaluations of safe migration interventions have a longer time
frame, which allow tracking migrant workers over time.

6.4

Recommendations for funding agencies

Translating several of the recommendations listed above into action requires substantial financial
investments. Funding agencies should increase investments to generate evidence on what works
to prevent debt-driven and/or debt-financed overseas labour migration. They can, for example,
support experiments with financial institutions to increase risk appetite for loans among the more
vulnerable and to design and offer low-cost financial products to migrants. They can also support
financial institutions to meet operational expenses until the programme becomes self-sustainable
and financially viable. They may invest in debt and financial literacy programming and financial
inclusion programmes through programme implementers and financial institutions. Funding
agencies may support state and local governments and programme implementers in setting up
ethical recruitment agencies and experiment with no-fee or employer-paying migration models.
Funding agencies may work with the national government, district and state governments,
programme implementers, and MEL practitioners to create a migration data ecosystem. They may
also advocate with and support international and bilateral agencies such as ILO, IOM, and World
Bank in generating comprehensive data on labour exploitations in various migration corridors.
Investing in formative and implementation research studies that could fill current evidence gaps,
as articulated in the sections on recommendations for MEL practitioners and programme
implementers, should be a priority for funding agencies.
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There is also a need for multi-donor collaborations to bring more attention to the issue of labour
exploitations experienced by overseas labour migrants among key stakeholders including the
Indian government and governments in destination countries.
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Annex Table 1: Background characteristics of surveyed households, selected districts, Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, 2021–22
Characteristics
Bihar
Uttar Pradesh
Combined
Religion
Hindu
78.4
81.1
79.8
Muslim
21.5
18.8
20.1
Christian / Sikhs
0.1
0.1
0.1
Caste
Scheduled castes
15.6
22.0
18.9
Scheduled tribes
8.3
3.7
6.0
Other backward castes
60.5
64.7
62.6
General
15.6
9.6
12.6
Place of residence
Urban
0.0
19.6
10.1
Rural
100.0
80.4
89.9
Type of ration card
Above poverty line card
42.4
50.3
46.4
Below poverty line card
25.4
23.4
24.4
Antyodaya card
2.5
12.6
7.7
No ration card
29.7
13.7
21.5
Household size
1-4
34.6
32.9
33.7
5-10
60.0
62.0
61.1
10 or more
5.4
5.1
5.3
Household economic condition
Standard of living index [mean, range 0–54]
22.5
24.0
23.3
Sold gold or land to repay debt in the last three years
2.9
2.6
2.8
Received financial entitlements from government schemes
45.5
53.8
49.8
Perceived that the household will not be able to pay at least
one loan taken in the last three years
35.7
38.2
37.0
Number of households
5,971
6,302
12,273
Annex Table 2: Background characteristics of surveyed respondents, India-Qatar and India- Saudi Arabia
migration corridors, 2015 and 2016
Background
India-Qatar
India-Saudi Arabia
Percentage (%)
Sample (N)
Percentage (%) Sample (N)
Age
21–30
48.4
194
37.7
154
31–40
44.9
180
57.5
235
41–50
6.7
27
4.7
19
51 and more
--0.2
1
Sex
Male
99.8
400
100
409
Female
0.2
1
--Level of education
None
--6.1
25
Incomplete Primary
--19.3
79
Completed Primary
0.8
3
31.3
128
Incomplete secondary
29.9
120
24.0
98
Completed secondary
56.9
228
18.6
76
Post-secondary/tertiary
1.0
4
0.7
3
University and Higher education
11.5
46
--Marital status
Unmarried
8.7
35
6.6
27
Married
91.3
366
93.9
382
Migrant type
First time
77.6
311
81.4
333
Repeater
22.4
90
18.6
76
Types of job application
Through agent/broker
7.7
31
79.6
324
Manpower agency
88.8
356
2.2
9
Relative/friends
3.5
14
18.2
74
Total
401
409
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